In January, Washington promised to virtually restart Venezuela's oil industry.
The logic seemed simple:
Maduro left → sanctions weakened → American companies return → investments grow → production increases → the world market goes more oil.
But the reality turned out to be much more complicated.
Almost eight months laterthere are still no major new agreements with American oil companies. The Trump administration had hoped for a quick recovery in the industry, but ExxonMobil and other big players continue to demand clearer terms.
And this is a very important signal.
Because even if Big Oil is in no hurry to invest billions, it means that the problem of Venezuela is not only the lack of money.
There is enough oil in Venezuela
The paradox is that Venezuela has the largest estimated oil reserves in the world.
But the presence of oil in the ground and the ability to profitably extract it are completely different things.
Years of nationalization, sanctions, underinvestment and destruction of infrastructure led to a sharp drop in production.
Production has now recovered to about1.2 million barrels per day— slightly higher than the level that the country produced before the tightening of American pressure.
But restoring production to significantly higher levels is a completely different task.
You will need:
new wells;
infrastructure repairs;
pipelines;
electricity;
equipment;
service companies;
huge long-term capital.
And that's where the problem comes in.
There is oil. And the investment environment is not yet attractive enough.
Chevron is already here, which is why its caution is particularly revealing
Chevron is an exception among American giants.
The company has maintained a presence in Venezuela even during the sanctions period and is now increasing production. In the second quarter of 2026, Chevron reported production of about280 kbopdin Venezuela and plans to increase volume by about 50% by 2028.
But even Chevron is in no hurry to make the large-scale investment breakthrough that Washington wants.
The reason is simple.
The company already knows the Venezuelan market from the inside.
And he understands how many political, legal and infrastructural risks there are.
For a new investor, this is an even more serious barrier.
The main question is who will get the best deposits?
This is one of the main stumbling blocks.
The most attractive assets are limited.
And different American and international companies compete for them.
In March, Reuters reported that Chevron was seeking rights to expand into Petropiar and neighboring Ayacucho 8 in the Orinoco Belt, one of the country's most attractive oil regions.
At the same time, other companies are considering their own projects.
And here begins the classic struggle for capital:
if the state offers the investor insufficiently attractive conditions, the company simply sends money to another country.
Exxon, for example, has a huge number of alternative projects around the world.
Venezuela should compete for capital not only with other oil countries.
She's competingwith all Exxon and Chevron investment opportunities simultaneously.
Old debts have not disappeared anywhere
Another problem is nationalization.
In the past, Venezuela has forcibly taken away the assets of foreign oil companies.
ExxonMobil has become one of the most famous examples.
According to Reuters, Venezuela owes Exxon about$984.5 millioncompensation for disputes related to the expropriation of its projects in 2007.
For other companies, the situation is even bigger.
ConocoPhillips, for example, seeks compensation for old expropriations worth more than$10 billion.
Therefore, for an oil company, the question does not sound simple:
“How much will we earn in the new field?”
It sounds like this:
“What guarantees that in a few years the state will not change the rules again?”
It is this fear that can cost Venezuela much more than a high tax rate.
Oilmen need guarantees, not promises
Back in January, ExxonMobil made it clear that it was ready to consider returning, but only with serious reforms.
The company needs:
investment protection + clear legislation + security + the ability to repatriate profits + a predictable tax system.
This is especially important for the oil business.
A well is not a project for several months.
A large deposit may require billions of dollars of investment and decades of operation.
An investor cannot build a financial model if he does not understand what rules will apply in five or ten years.
That is why political stability for Big Oil is not an abstract factor.
This is part of the project cost.
And then there was an earthquake
On June 24, 2026, Venezuela was shaken by strong earthquakes.
Chevron said that its facilities were inspected and continued to operate, but the company sent$1 million for humanitarian aidvictims.
The earthquake itself did not create an investment problem for Venezuela.
But it reminded investors about the state of the country's infrastructure.
If the energy system, roads, ports, pipelines and power grids require restoration, the cost of the new project becomes higher.
This means that the investor has to pledge an additional risk premium.
Why does Trump want oil faster than companies want to invest?
Two different logics collide here.
For Washington, Venezuela is a potential source of additional oil supply.
More production means more barrels in the global market and potentially less pressure on prices.
In addition, the United States is interested in Venezuelan oil going not to geopolitical competitors, but to Western markets.
The Trump administration has already stated that it has begun to organize the sale of Venezuelan oil through American controlled financial mechanisms.
But oil companies think differently.
For them, the question is not:
“Does the world need Venezuelan oil?”
A:
“Will we get a sufficient return taking into account all the risks?”
And so far there is no answer to the second question.
The most interesting thing is that oil can come to the market before investments
This is an important nuance.
Venezuela is already increasing exports and production.
But the large-scale recovery of the oil industry requires much more time.
Reuters previously noted that a full recovery of production could takefive to seven yearseven with a relatively stable political situation.
Therefore, the expectation that Venezuela will quickly flood the world market with oil may be too optimistic.
More supplies are possible.
Millions of additional barrels in the short term are much more difficult.
What does this mean for the oil market?
If US companies slowly increase investment, Venezuela will not be able to quickly realize all its potential production gains.
This is important for the oil market.
Because an additional supply from Venezuela could partially compensate for disruptions in other regions of the world.
But so far this reserve remains ratherpotentialthan guaranteed.
For a trader, this means that Washington's statements about the future growth of Venezuelan production should not be automatically perceived as an immediate bearish factor for oil.
Years can pass between a political decision and the first additional barrel.
Main conclusion
Venezuela got what it had been missing for years:
access to American capital, Washington's political support and the ability to attract large oil companies.
But allowing yourself to invest is not enough.
ExxonMobil and Chevron look at the country through a different calculator:
geology + infrastructure + taxes + debts + security + politics + likelihood of rule changes.
And so far, this calculation does not look attractive enough for the rapid inflow of tens of billions of dollars.
Therefore, the main story of Venezuela now is not abouthow much oil is underground.
It's about,how much capital it will take to turn this oil back into stable production.
And it depends on the answer to this question whether Venezuela will become a new major source of supply in the world market or will remain a country with huge reserves that are too expensive and risky to develop.
What does this mean for the market?
For oil, the main factor now is not the promises of new investments, butthe speed of their transformation into real prey.
If the deals are signed and capital starts flowing in, Venezuela will gradually be able to increase supply.
If negotiations continue to stall, the country's potential will remain limited.
For Brent and WTI, this means a simple thing:
venezuelan barrels cannot be considered a full-fledged source of additional supply until they are backed by real investment, infrastructure and new capacity.
